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THOMAS R. NICOLAI*

The European Patent Convention:
A Theoretical and Practical Look
at International Legislation
I. Introduction
The international landmark in the industrial property area is the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property signed in
1883 at Paris (hereinafter cited also as Paris Convention). In 1962, the
Commission of the European Economic Community had published a draft
European Patent Convention. Because this draft Convention is so intimately connected with the EEC, it can be viewed as a regional arrangement whose provisions reflect interests and motivations which may not
always be identical, or even compatible, with those underlying the Paris
Convention, a treaty of broader, more truly international applicability.
Since all of the Member States of the Common Market are signatories of
the Paris Convention, the terms of any treaty agreement between them on
matters of industrial property law in general, and on patent law in particular (whether relying directly on the 1962 draft or not), will have to conform
to the applicable provisions of the Paris Convention.
The general subject of this article is the proposed European Patent
Convention (herinafter cited also as EPC). Part II hereof gives a short
historical survey of the interest in and development of a uniform patent law
in Europe. It also includes a discussion of the legislative proposals underlying the EPC, together with the practical and legal problems which they
raise. In Part III, the focus is on the most controversial legal question with
respect to the EPC, that of "availability" of the European patent to nationals of third party states. The relationship of the EPC to the Paris Convention furnishes the framework for examining the problem of availability.
Finally, in Part IV, the concept of an international legislative process, and
certain legal principles of treaty conflict, are discussed in the context of the
EPC and the problem of availability of the European patent.
*J.D., Univ. of Michigan Law School; Volkswagen Special Stipend, Administered by the
Alexander von Humbolt Foundation, for research study at Max-Planck Institute for Foreign
and International Patent, Copyright, and Competition Law, Munich.
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II. Historical
Sophisticated and technical plans for the harmonization of European
patent laws have been in existence since the late 1940's. 1 With the establishment of the European Economic Community by the Treaty of Rome on
1 January 1958, the substance of these plans was examined with renewed
interest. At this point in time, however, emphasis was principally on
harmonization of national patent laws solely within the Common Market,
rather than on a broader, more inclusive European basis.
In 1962 the EEC published a Draft Treaty Relating to a European
Patent Law (hereinafter cited as Draft Treaty). 2 The Draft Treaty was
motivated by the consideration that artificial economic barriers created by
national patent systems represented a serious impediment to realization of
the goals of the Rome Treaty.
Conceived as a customs ,union, the basic objective of the EEC is the
elimination within its territory of all economic barriers to free trade. By
introducing a patent which would be valid simultaneously in all Common
Market countries, differences between national patent systems and consequent national territorial barriers to the free flow of goods, could be
minimized and perhaps avoided altogether. Thus, the Draft Treaty was
viewed as wholly commensurate with the goals and purposes of the Rome
3
Treaty.
There existed also other factors which motivated the drive toward establishing a European patent law. In recent years, technological advances and
new scientific discoveries have resulted in an ever-increasing number of
applications for patent protection. As a practical matter, the multiplicity of
filing and other administrative procedures among the disparate national
systems, together with the lack of qualified administrative personnel, has
contributed to the inability of national patent offices to keep pace with their
growing burden of work. 4 This situation has led to great difficulty and
'See generally Ladas, Industrial Property, in STEIN and NICHOLSON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE2 IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE (Ann Arbor 1960), 247- 256.
The Draft Treaty was a product of the Working Group for patents whose president and
secretary were Dr. Kurt Hartel and Dr. Franz Froschmaier, respectively. Experts from the
Member States and other representatives from the EEC, EURATOM and ECSC completed
the membership of the Working Group. See, generally, OUDEMANS, THE DRAFT EUROPEAN
PATENT CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (London 1963), 1-2.
3
Regarding the legal relationship of the European Patent Convention to the Rome
Treaty, Article 36 of the latter is often cited as indicating an intention of the Rome Treaty not
to include national patent laws within its jurisdiction. But see also Article 220 of the Rome
Treaty, and v. d. Gr6ben, "Rechtsangleichung auf dem Gebiet des gewerblichen Rechtsschutzes im Rahmen der Europiischen Wirtschaftgemeinschaft," 1959 Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Tel 629 (hereinafter cited as GRU R INT.).
4
The preamble to a resolution taken at the Hague in April of 1956 by the Patent
Commissioners of Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, Austria, Norway and Sweden reads as
follows: "This meeting, taking notice that nearly all the European Patent Offices which
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expense in obtaining patent protection. Under these circumstances the
basement tinkerer, as well as the smaller company, stands at a distinct
disadvantage vis-A-vis the large, well-financed corporation in respect of
access to patents.
Viewed at the international level, this fact is but one facet of the fear of
some Europeans of economic domination by American corporations. 5 The
possibility of removing any discriminatory advantage in obtaining patent
protection, incidental though it may be, through the establishment of a
European patent law, is easily understandable as a potential factor underlying the Draft Treaty. The interesting question concerns the method by
which such incidental discrimination will be removed-whether patent
procurement will be made less expensive by creating efficiency in existing
institutions and procedures, or whether limitation of the availability of the
European patent to certain persons qualifying for it will be the approach
taken. It should be noted that the second alternative goes much further
than the first, which itself would be sufficient, in theory, to eliminate any
discriminatory advantage through the creation of equal access by all to the
patent right.
The fact that the Draft Treaty has followed generally the second alternative is a consequence of its link with the Rome Treaty, and it is also a
demonstration of its broader intention than the mere creation of a more
efficient system. Actually, the Draft Treaty had a dual purpose. Primarily,
it was designed to supplement the enforcement of the structure of the
Treaty of Rome. Secondly, it was intended to provide, in the form of
international legislation, a uniform patent law for a number of European
states greater than those of the EEC.
This latter purpose is interesting in that it represents a preference for
uniform legislation over harmonization of national legislation in the patent
field. The principal reason for this choice of method was the realization by
the EEC Member States that industrial property rights are subject to the
principle of territoriality. Even were national statutes to be harmonized to
the desired extent, the separate systems would continue to present terriundertake a search for novelty have difficulty in disposing of the present very large number of
applications for patents because of the general shortage of technically-trained staff, and the
increasing volume of search material and complexity of inventions, observing that where
applications in respect of the same invention are lodged in more than one of these Offices the
search for novelty has to be made in each of them, thus leading to a considerable repetition of
work, and being of the opinion that this repetition of work might be avoided to some extent if
the result of a search in one Office could be available to other Offices in which an application
in respect of the same invention has been made, (recommends)..." Ladas, in STEIN and
NICHOLSON, supra, note I, 249.
5
See, generally, SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE (New York 1967).
For the basic French position, see Wall Street Journal, Feb. 24, 1966, 8, col. 2. See also
note 46 and accompanying text, infra.
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torial barriers-because patent validity depends on the territorial principle-to the free flow of goods. Uniform legislation had the advantage of
avoiding this territorial problem.6
It is interesting to note the potential legal consequences under international law of the alternative methods of creating a European patent
law. Had differing national laws been harmonized individually, any resulting benefits would have accrued automatically to all states parties to the
International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883. 7 This result would have followed from the national-treatment principle established by that Convention.8 But by creating uniform legislation
the way remained potentially open to limit to signatory states the resulting
benefits or advantages under the Draft Treaty by claiming a "special
arrangement," an exception to the national treatment principle which is
expressly recognized by the Paris Convention. 9
Adherence to the proposed patent convention, which was open to all
member countries of the Paris Union (the body of states signatory to the
Paris Convention), was provided for in the Draft Treaty by the alternative
procedures of accession' ° and association." Under either provision, the
unanimous decision of an "Administrative Council," whose members were
to be representatives of the founder Common Market countries, was required. This arrangement created considerable leverage in the EEC Member States to determine the terms of accession or of associate membership.
On the other hand, as Dr. Froschmaier has observed, "a certain incentive
OSee Froschmaier, Some Aspects of the Draft Convention Relating to a European Patent
Law, 12 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 886, 887-888 (1963).
7
The legal relationship of the European Patent Convention to the Paris Convention is
discussed in detail in Part Ill.

"This principle is found in Article 2 of the Paris Convention, which is reproduced in the
text, p. 143, infra.
9
Article 15 is the relevant provision of the Paris Convention. It is reproduced in the text,
p. 145, infra.

"0Article 211. Accession:
(1) Any State which is a party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property may apply to accede to this Convention. It shall address its application to the
(Administrative Council) whose decision must be unanimous.
(2) The terms of admission and, as far as necessary, the adaptations of this Convention
called for by that admission, shall be the subject of a special agreement between the Contracting States and the State requesting admission. This special agreement shall be submitted
for ratification by all Contracting States in conformity with their respective constitutional
practice.
(3) Preparatory work for drawing up the special agreement shall be in the hands of the
(Administrative Council).
"Article 212. Association:
(1) Any State which is a party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property may apply to be associated with this Convention by virtue of a special agreement
concluded with the Contracting States and involving reciprocal rights and obligations. It shall
address its application to the (Administrative Council) whose decision shall be unanimous.
(2) Preparatory work for drawing up of the special agreement shall be the responsibility of
the (Administrative Council).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
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to association may be seen in the fact that it would permit European States
outside the Six to lessen the burden on the national patent offices in so far
as they proceed to an examination, or to have the opportunity of obtaining
examined patents even for their territory if their national law does not
provide for examination. " 12 As to full accession, Dr. Froschmaier has
added that it "only seems to make sense for a country where virtually no
tariff barriers exist between it and the Six." 13
The basic objectives of the Draft Treaty may be summarized as follows:
(1) the creation of a "supranational" patent system in conformity with the
Paris Convention; (2) the creation of a federal patent system coexisting
with national patent systems (coexistence principle); 14 (3) the creation of a
European Patent Office responsible for the issuance of "European" patents; (4) the employment of a deferred examination procedure. Point (1)
reflected the integral relationship of the proposed patent convention to the
Rome Treaty, while the second point constituted a supposedly temporary,
but practical, necessity for the establishment of a European system. Points
(3) and (4) represented efficiency-creating devices for the administration of
the new system.
The Draft Treaty itself was an exceptionally professional and thorough
piece of proposed legislation. Its provisions covered matters of substance
as well as procedure, including administrative procedure for grant, standards of patentability, subject-matter restrictions, annuities, working requirements and duration of the patent right. The provisions dealing with
accession and association demonstrated the Draft Treaty's conceived applicability to all interested European states. Article Five' 5 dealt with the
issue of "availability" of the European patent to states not parties to the
proposed convention. There were two suggested variants to Article 5, one
providing for free availability and the other conditioning availability on the
fulfillment of certain restrictive requirements.
Failure to reach agreement on which variant to adopt, threatened to
undermine the future of the Draft Treaty. In 1965, Dr. Kurt Hirtel, the
chief architect of the Draft Treaty, described the problem:
12Froschmaier, supra, note 6, at 891.
13

1d.

14

The coexistence principle was one of the most important features of the (1962) Draft
Treaty, for both legal and practical reasons. See, e.g., the discussion on this subject in the
text, pp. 144-145, infra. Pursuant to the principle, national laws will coexist with a uniform
European law for an indeterminate period. The alternative plan to coexistence would have
been the exclusivity of the uniform European law through the abolition of existing national
laws. This alternative plan would have required free availability of the European patent to all
Unionist countries. See the discussion of this point in the text, pp. 143-144, infra. But noting
that recent European discussions on the European patent have emphasized the principle of
reciprocal national treatment, the legal impact of the coexistence principle on the issue of
availability apparently has been considerably diminished. See text, infra, pp. 151-154.
15 Reproduced in the text, infra, p. 143.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
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The work on a European patent law, which on a technical level nearly had
been finished, was brought to a standstill by differences of opinion over basic
political questions. Opposing the concept of the so-called international patent
was the concept of the so-called EEC patent. The two concepts distinguish
themselves basically in the way that non-EEC states can participate in the
convention relating to a European patent law. In the case of the EEC patent,
the convention regime would have to remain reserved to the EEC countries;
apart from that, however, the strongly desired participation of a third state
could be so formed and agreed upon as to accomodate its particular interests.
In the case of international patent, a so-called general convention would
encompass all participants on an equal basis. However, as a consequence of
the greater number of participating states, the convention would be limited to
the common issuance of a so-called "Bundle-Patent," which, following issuance, would become transformed into separate national patents. It would
remain up the EEC countries to conclude an additional convention applicable
only to their territory, which would provide for a reconstruction of the
"bundle," and for the formulation
of more comprehensive rules to be applied
6
under this uniform law.1

However, on 21 May 1969, 17 European nations1 7 convened an International Patent Conference at Brussels to begin negotiations on the
establishment of an "international" procedure for the issuance of patents.
The negotiations were initiated and promoted by the EEC. In and EEC
Council Memorandum 8 (hereinafter cited as Memorandum) sent to several
European countries inviting them to participate, the Council indicated that
the negotiators would adopt as their basis the 1962 Draft Treaty, the 1963
Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on
Patents for Invention,' 9 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty 20 proposed in
1968 by the United International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual
Property (BIRPI).
The Memorandum envisaged a "two-convention" arrangement. One, the
so-called international convention, would be open to all states parties to the
Paris Convention (but probably, as a practical matter, be concluded primarily by interested European states) and would deal with an international
patent issuance procedure. Following issuance of the patent, the various
national laws of the participating states would be determinative of the legal
' 6 Hirtel, Die Bemiihungen um eine Patentrechtsvereinheitlichung im Rahmen der Europdiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 1966 GRUR INT., 134, 135. (Author's Trans.)
"7Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Turkey.
181969

GRUR

INT.,

226-228.

"9Regarding this Convention, Dr. Froschmaier has said: "it seems obvious that the
ratification of the Council of Europe's draft would decisively facilitate the association of other
European States to the European Patent Convention. In this perspective it is permitted to
hope that the possibility of association will be of considerable practical importance and might
even constitute the way towards the unification of patent law within a larger group of States
prepared to collaborate." Froschmaier, supra, note 6, 891-892.
20Reprinted in 839 Patent Office Gazette 413, June 13, 1967. See also, Goldsmith, ABC
of PCT, 49

PATENT OFFICE SOCIETY

(JPOS), 877 (1968).
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rights attaching to the patent within national territories. A second convention, the so-called Community convention, would be concluded only
among the EEC Member States. It would have as its aim the uniformity of
patent rights within the territory of the Common Market. Accordingly,
national laws would not be determinative of rights attaching to the European patent for the Community territory, although national patent laws
would continue to exist. Quite recently, first preliminary drafts of both
conventions have been made public. 21 Each draft follows closely the
scheme envisaged by the Memorandum.
The current negotiations do not necessarily imply that substantial progress on the issue of "availability" under the 1962 Draft Treaty has been

made. Actually, the international convention of the "two-convention" arrangement appears to offer its participating members substantially the same
benefits as would probably be forthcoming under the proposed Patent

Cooperation Treaty. Thus, the first preliminary draft of the international
convention has, as might have been expected, eliminated the Draft Treaty
provisions respecting full and associate membership which were designed

to give considerable bargaining power to the Common Market countries.
But due principally to the regional character of the international convention, participation in the Patent Cooperation Treaty is likely to be made
less attractive to European countries. Consequently, the timing between
the 1968 proposal for a Patent Cooperation Treaty and the International

Patent Conference negotiations, raises suspicion of political tactics rather
than the implication that the resolution of the issue of availability and of
attendant legal questions has been achieved.
The Memorandum contained a separate paragraph relating specifically to
the matter of availability of the European patent. 22 In it the Common

Market countries expressed their desire to be in harmony with the principle
21

For an unofficial English language text of each, see CCH Com. Mkt. Rep. paras.
5503 ff (international convention) and 575 ff (Community convention).
22
1n Part I1 of the Memorandum, 3, entitled "Die Akzessibilit it," states: "Die Mitgliedstaaten der EWG wollen im Einklang mit Artikel 2 der Pariser Verbandsibereinkunft in
dem Ubereinkommen vorsehen, da B Staatsangelbrige von Staaten, die nicht Vertragspartei
des ubereinkommens sind, Zugang zum europ aischen Patent unter der Voraussetzung erhalten, da B diese Staaten den Staatsangelirigen der am ibereinkommen beteiligten Staaten
denselben Schutz einr aumen, den sie ihren eigenen Staatsangelbrigen bei der Erlangung
nationaler Patente zubilligen. Die Beurteilung dieser Bedingung wurde im Rahmen einer
gerichtlichen Prufung den Instanzen zufallen, die nach den im Obereinkommen vorzusehenden Verfahren fiber die Streitfalle zu befinden haben." [The Member States of the EEC,
pursuant to Article 2 of the Paris Convention, wish to provide, in the (European Patent)
Convention, that nationals of states not parties to the Convention should have access to the
European patent on the condition that these states accord to nationals of states participating in
the Convention the same protection in the procurement of national patents that is accorded to
their own nationals. The determination of this condition would fall within the jurisdiction of
the courts, which would decide disputes according to a procedure to be provided in the
Convention. (author's trans.)] 1969 GRUR INT. 226, 227.
InternationalLawyer, Vol 5, No. I
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of national treatment of the Paris Convention, thereby implying that the
European patent would be available to all Unionist states, even though
non-signatory. But this position was qualified by the additional statement
that the European patent would be available to nationals of all third states
"on the condition that these states accord to the nationals of states participating in the Convention the same protection in the procurement of national patents that is accorded to their own nationals." 23 It has been suggested
that this language is intended to condition the availability of the European
patent on the existence of "legal and factual reciprocity" with respect to

national treatment of foreign nationals. 24 Recent reports on the International Patent Conference proceedings give support to this characterization of the current status of the availability issue. 25
The problem of availability is an interesting one, and it will be pursued in

one way or another in the remainder of this article. The Memorandum and
the preliminary draft of the so-called international convention purport to

put the issue of availability in terms of reciprocal national treatment. This
formulation of the issue may be an attempt possibly to justify some form of
limited availability, and it may or may not be merely a rephrasing of the

same issue under the Draft Treaty. Accordingly, my analysis will begin
with the two variants to Article 5 of the 1962 Draft Treaty.
III. The "Availability" Problem: Concerning the Relationship of the
European Patent Convention to the Paris Convention
Since its conclusion in 1883, the Paris Convention has been revised
several times-the latest being in 1968 at the Stockholm Conference. More
than 50 countries-including all the Member States of the EEC, the remaining eleven countries participating in the current International Patent
Conference and also the United States-are parties to the Paris Convention.
23See supra, note 22. Compare Article 5 of the (1970) Draft Convention for a European
System for the Grant of Patents, which reads in pertinent part: ". . . (the European patent

shall be freely available to the nationals of such state) in so far as the legislation of such State
grants to nationals of the Contracting States the same advantages as regards the protection of
inventions as it grants to nationals of the said State, and in particular in so far as it does not
subject the grant of a patent to conditions which can be met only in the territory of the State in
question..." CCH Com. Mkt. Rep., 5509. For the view of a well-informed German lawyer
linking the language of Article 5 to United States practice under § 119 of the Patent Code, see
Deringer, "Fortschritte auf dem Wege zum europaischen und EWG-Patent," 1970 Aussenwirtschaftsdienst 204, 206. See also, notes 39-43, infra, and accompanying text.
24
Froschmaier, addressing the class in Law and Institutions in the Atlantic Area, University of Michigan Law School, 27 October 1969.
25See Hirtel, "Die Entwfirfe der Ubereinkommen uber ein europiisches System der
Erteilung von Patenten und iuber ein Patent fur den Gemeinsamen Markt," 1970 GRUR INT.,
95; van Benthem, "Erster Vorentwurf eines Ubereinkommens uber ein europiiisches Patenterteilungsverfahren," id., p. 102. See also, infra, note 43, and accompanying text.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 5, No. I

The European Patent Convention

In Article 2 of the Paris Convention, the principle of national treatment
is established. This central feature of the Convention requires each contracting state to accord to the nationals of all other contracting states, the
same rights and advantages as to the protection of industrial property as
are accorded to its own nationals. Specifically, Article 2 provides:
The nationals of each of the countries of the Union shall, as regards the
protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union
the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter grant, to
their nationals, without prejudice to the rights specially provided by the present
Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter,
and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided
they observe the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals.
In view of this provision, a question of law is raised as to whether either
or both of the two variants to Article 5 of the Draft Treaty are consistent
with the principle of national treatment. (In analyzing these variants a
terminological distinction is drawn between "availability" and "accessibility": accessibility is used in the sense of opportunity to adhere to the treaty
as a signatory with all the rights and duties, powers and liabilities which
that entails, whereas availability is used in the broader sense of opportunity
to avail oneself of the benefits of the treaty irrespective of signatory status.
Thus, when availability is limited by an accession requirement, "limited"
(as opposed to "free") availability implies an effective benefit-burden relationship equivalent to accession. The two variants read:
Article 5. Persons entitled to apply for European patents.
Ist Variant
Any person desiring to obtain protection for his invention for the whole of
the territory of the Contracting States, may apply for a European patent.
2nd Variant
(1) Any natural or legal person or any body equivalent by virtue of national
law, to a legal person, possessing the nationality of one of the Contracting
States, who desires to obtain protection for his invention for the whole of the
territory of the Contracting States, may apply for a European patent.
(2) The application for a European patent must be based on one or more
applications for a national patent filed in one of the Contracting States and
constituting first filings within the meaning of Article 4 of the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property, of 20th March, 1883, last revised at
Lisbon on 31st October, 1958.
The first variant is clearly consistent with the Paris Convention. It
espouses a policy of "free" availability to "any person," a policy wholly
consonant with the national-treatment principle. In the event that national
laws are abolished altogether (as opposed to coexisting), availability conditioned upon accession, i.e., an "open" convention, would probably not
26
satisfy the national-treatment principle.
26
PROP.

See Ulmer, The Availability of European Patents and the Paris Convention, 1963
5 1, 57; and OUDEMANS, supra, note 2, p. 9.
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The first variant avoids this difficulty by providing for free availability to
Unionist and non-Unionist states alike, without the prerequisite of accession to the European Patent Convention. The solution of the availability
problem by adoption of the first Article 5 variant would be the clearest and
most certain from a legal standpoint.
The second variant, on the other hand, presents serious difficulties. It
embodies a policy of "limited" availability. In this variant's first paragraph,
a nationality requirement is established. In the second paragraph availability is further limited by the requirement that the applicant's filing must
constitute a first filing within the meaning of Article Four 27 of the Paris
Convention, and be effected in one of the Contracting States of the EPC.
Under the first restriction, a national of a Unionist state not a party to the
EPC would find the European patent unavailable. Seemingly, this result
would constitute discriminatory treatment on the basis of nationality, and
consequently be in direct violation of Article 2 of the Paris Convention.
The second restriction appears not only to negate the priority provision in
Article 4, but to contravene Article 2 of the Paris Convention as well. By
restricting availability of the European patent to those applicants who file
first in a Contracting State of the EPC, nationals of non-contracting Unionist states who file first in their own countries, and within one year in an
EPC Contracting State, receive neither Paris-Convention priority nor national treatment.
An introductory note to the Draft Treaty states, however, that the Draft
Treaty constitutes, as between the Contracting States, a "special arrangement" in the sense of Article 15 of the Paris Convention. Moreover,
additional evidence of lack of intention to contravene the provisions of the
Paris Convention is found in Article 8 of the Draft Treaty, which provides:
This Convention shall be without prejudice to any commitments entered into
by the Contracting States by virtue of other international agreements.
In this connection, the principle of co-existence of national and European law is of great importance. Article 5, second variant, presupposes
the continued existence of national laws. Article 5, first variant, is only
27

A- 1. Any person who has regularly filed an application for a patent of invention, or for
a utility model (petty patent) or for a design patent or for the registration of a trademark in one
of the countries of the Union, or his legal representative or assign, shall enjoy, for the purpose
of filing applications in the other countries, a right of priority during the periods hereinafter
stated.
2. Every application which is equivalent to a regular national application under the home
law of any country of the Union or under bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded between
countries of the Union shall be recognized as giving rise to a right of priority.
3. By a regular national application is meant any filing which is adequate to establish the
date on which the application was filed in the country concerned, whatever may be the
ultimate outcome of that application.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
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permissive in this regard. In view of the effect of the second variant and of
the expressed intention in the Draft Treaty to conform to the Paris Convention, the central question is raised whether the continued existence of
national patent laws satisfies the national treatment principle, even though
the availability of the European patent is limited.
The proponents of free availability argue that it does not. In their view,
not only does Article 2 of the Paris Convention require free availability,
but that approach alone is consistent with the objectives and purposes of
the Rome Treaty; for, if foreign applications are to be barred, the ultimate
goal of a free circulation of goods throughout the entire Common Market
territory might never be attained. National patents would continue to exist,
and thus present a self-defeating situation.
This argument becomes particularly persuasive when one considers the
large number of foreign applications being filed in Europe annually, especially by American applicants. A second compelling reason for opposing
limited availability is found in the suggestion that "it won't work." Evasion
of the intended effect of a restrictive policy would be possible, since foreign
applicants could satisfy the second variant's nationality requirement by
filing through assignees, subsidiary companies or the like. And at present
these account for the majority of "foreign" patent applications. Thirdly, the
European Patent Office might never become an independent,
self-supporting organ if national patent offices retain their present volume
of work and importance.
If a policy of limited availability is pursued, the most likely result will be,
if not the above-mentioned evasion of that policy's intention, then certainly
a continuation of the large number of foreign applications being handled by
national patent offices. The diminution of the role of, and burden on, the
national patent offices, together with a centralizing shift of emphasis and
administration to the European Patent Office, could be achieved by allowing free availability. Simultaneously, the benefits of efficiency through
cooperation and elimination of duplication could contribute to the probable
28
success of the new system.
The proponents of limited availability have relied primarily on Article 15
of the Paris Convention, which provides:
It is understood that the countries of the Union reserve the right to make
between themselves special arrangements for the protection of industrial property, in so far as these arrangements do not contravene the provisions of the
present Convention.
Special agreements within the meaning of Article 15 include both bilater28

See, generally, OUDEMANS, supra, note 2, pp. 8- 12.
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al and multilateral agreements between member states of the Paris Union.
The so-called "Restricted Unions" are examples of multilateral agreements
whose purpose is to provide for a closer association than the Paris Convention. These special agreements may be "open" or "closed," meaning
subject to free or limited accessibility with respect to Unionist states.
Examples of open "Restricted Unions" are the Madrid Arrangement on
the Prevention of False Indications of Source, the Madrid Arrangement
on the International Registration of Trade Marks, the Hague Arrangement
on the International Deposit of Industrial Designs or Models, and the
Lisbon Arrangement on the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their
International Registration. These open agreements have been concluded
within the framework of the Paris Convention, and provide that any
Unionist country may accede to them.
Essential to a solution to the legal issue concerning availability under the
proposed EPC is the interrelationship between Article 2 of the Paris
Convention on national treatment and Article 15 of that Convention on the
conclusion of special agreements. In particular, it must be determined
whether Article 15 in some way limits the national-treatment principle of
Article 2, or whether that principle remains intact despite the conclusion of
a special agreement, such that any advantages accruing to nationals of
Unionist states signatory to that agreement, within the national territory
and by virtue of the special agreement, must be accorded to nationals of
non-signatory Unionist states.
Those in favor of limited availability of the European patent have given
a narrow interpretation to Article 2 of the Paris Convention. Relying on
the language "respective laws" in that Article, an attempt is made to draw
a distinction between domestic laws and treaties which have become integrated into domestic law, either automatically from the time of' ratification by virtue of constitutional provisions, or subsequently by amendment
of domestic law. The additional phrase in Article 2, stipulating "without
prejudice to the rights specially provided by the present Convention," is
cited as evidence of this distinction. Despite the potentially identical effect
domestically, it is argued that the principle of national treatment extends
only to the original domestic law of each country. It is correctly pointed
out that the Paris Convention is not based on a most-favored-nation principle, and that it would be unfair to extend to all Unionist countries the
advantages given to one or to several countries, without extending also any
29
accompanying burdens.
29

See Colas, Would Non-accessibility of the Benefits of the European Patent Convention
to Nationals of Third Party Countries Be Contrary to Article 2 of the Paris Convention of
1883?, 1963 IND. PROP. 48.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I

The EuropeanPatent Convention

While this position is in part accurate, it does not describe the situation
in all of its aspects. It is undoubtedly true that the Paris Convention does
not require MFN treatment, but national treatment only. However, when a
special agreement results in advantages being enjoyed by foreign nationals
and home nationals alike within a Unionist country, the absence of MFN
treatment cannot be urged equitably as a basis for avoiding the obligation
of national treatment of all Unionist nationals. If, in contrast, as a result of
a special agreement, foreign nationals are given advantages not similarly
enjoyed by home nationals, the Paris Convention does not require that
these advantages be accorded to Unionist nationals. And, similarly, if
home nationals enjoy abroad advantages not enjoyed within the national
territory, the national-treatment principle is again inapplicable.
In support of this analysis is an interpretation by Frayne, an advocate of
free availability, of the word "advantages" appearing in Article 2 of the
Paris Convention. According to this interpretation, the "advantages"
which the foreigner and the national should share should be:
(!)advantages which would be available in the national territory but excluding advantages permitting the acquisition by a national of rights in foreign
countries, whereby the benefit of an arrangement which merely provides for
the acquisition of such latter rights could well be refused to the national of a
non-signatory country, without any violation of Article 2.
(2) substantive rights as opposed to mere advantages in the domain of
formalities and procedure; the consequence of which would be that, if an
arrangement modifies the extent of protection (i.e., a substantive right) in
favour of the national, then the national of a non-signatory country-an outsider-would be entitled to claim the benefit of it, whereas the benefit of an
arrangement which only confers advantages of a mere procedural or formal
character could be refused to an outsider, without violating Article 2 of the
Convention."0
This interpretation distinguishes between those special-agreement advantages effective solely on national territory and those effective elsewhere, as well as between those advantages which are substantive, and
those which are procedural in nature. It has been criticized as an arbitrary
interpretation if it assumes an equivalence between domestic law and a
special agreement. As has been explained above, the application of the
national-treatment principle in particular cases, not an assertion of equivalence, is the operational character of Article 2 of the Paris Convention.
Moreover, the contradiction between the national-treatment principle
and limited availability can not be explained satisfactorily by the "quite
revolutionary character of this European legislation. 3 1 Admittedly, the
30
Colas, supra, note 29, at 49. See also Frayne, The EEC and the National Treatment
Principle, 39 CAN. PAT. REP. 69 (1963).
3

aCompare Colas, supra, note 29, 51.
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Draft Treaty provides for the conferring of extra-territorial rights and for
the creation of supranational authorities responsible for the issuance of
European patents. Still, sovereign states will be parties to the EPC as they
are to the Paris Convention. The conclusion of the former must take into
account existing international obligations of the contracting states. In particular, states cannot absolve themselves of the obligations of the Paris
3 2
Convention by transferring certain powers to a supranational community.
In this connection, reference may be made again to Article 8 of the Draft
Treaty which squarely indicates that conclusion of the proposed patent
convention would leave unaffected the obligations assumed under other
international agreements.
Further insight regarding the interrelationship between Articles 2 and 15
of the Paris Convention may be had by examining other arrangements
which, like the EPC, provide for a single application with effect in several
contracting states. Although the possible limitation of the principle of
national treatment by the power to conclude special agreements had been
mentioned previously, it will be helpful in this context to restate the issue
more fully in the following way:
... (l)f a number of Unionist countries form a "Restricted Union" providing
for a specified degree of minimum protection, it will detract from the value of
the special agreement if its advantages are also made available to nationals of
such Unionist countries which do not grant a corresponding minimum protection. Furthermore, if the agreement is an open agreement, the incentive for
other States to adhere to it is diminished if nationals of such other States may
benefit by the provisions of the special agreement in any case ...
Consequently, only then would it be justified to assume that the principle of
national treatment may be limited by special agreements, if it could be shown
(i) that the application of the principle of national treatment generally and
decisively negatives the value and significance of special agreements, and
consequently (ii) that the power granted by Article 15 of the Paris Convention ... in order to mean anything, necessarily implies a limitation on the

principle of national treatment. 33
It is submitted that even if the national-treatment principle is not limited,
sufficient latitude and incentive remain for the conclusion of special agreements under Article 15 of the Paris Convention. This proposition is supported by the discussion below of the Arrangement of Madrid on Marks
and the Arrangement of the Hague on Designs. Both of these special
agreements are so-called Restricted Unions created by the contracting
parties within the framework of the Paris Union:
The arrangement of Madrid provides that the nationals of contracting countries and persons assimilated thereto can ensure the protection of their trade
marks registered in the country of origin by means of the deposit of those
32

See 5 Hackworth, INT'L. L. 360, 366 (1944).
UImer, supra, note 26, 54.

33
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marks with the International Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property,
effected through the Administration of the country of origin ... The international registration ensures for the mark in the other countries of the
Restricted Union the same protection as if it had been deposited
directly ... By virtue of the new text of the Arrangement adopted at the
Conference of Revision of Nice (1957), the contracting countries can, however, declare that the protection arising from the international registration will
only extend to their countries if the owner of the mark expressly requests it.
By the provisions of the Arrangement of the Hague on Industrial Designs,
an international deposit can be made without a previous national deposit. The
original text and the London text of the Arrangement provide that the Nationals of the countries of the Restricted Union ... can ensure in all the other
contracting countries the protection of their industrial designs by an international deposit. This international deposit will produce in the countries
concerned the same effects as if the designs had been deposited directly. At the
Conference of Revision of The Hague in 1960 this rule was limited in the sense
that the effect of the deposit would only extend to countries nominated by the
depositor in his application. On the other hand, however, the anomaly arising
from the fact that the deposit, although it was possible directly without a
previous national deposit, would not produce any effect in the country of origin
has been suppressed. On the basis of the new text of the Arrangement adopted
at the Conference of Revision of The Hague, the protection arising from the
international deposit can also be claimed in the country of origin where the
legislation of that country does not provide otherwise. .. 3

Both the Madrid and the Hague Arrangements provide for an international deposit of marks or designs. Even though the international
deposit is available only to nationals of the countries of the Restricted
Union, both Agreements are compatible with Article 2 of the Paris Con35
vention, along the line of Frayne's analysis suggested above.
In the case of the Madrid Arrangement and the original and London
versions of the Hague Arrangement the international deposit is ineffective
as regards protection in the territory of origin. Through the international
deposit, protection is afforded only as to the territory of countries of the

Restricted Union other than the country of origin. National protection
must be had by national deposit. Under Article 2 of the Paris Convention,
nationals of countries of the Paris Union cannot demand more than nation-

al treatment, i.e., protection effective in the national territory itself. Since
both foreign nationals and home nationals are treated equally as regards the

protection of marks or designs in the national territory, there is effective
compliance with Article 2 of the Paris Convention.
With the 1960 revised text of the Hague Arrangement, protection for the
country of origin was also made available by way of the international
deposit. Nationals of Restricted-Union countries now have two ways of
obtaining national protection, one by way of national deposit and the other
34
1d.,
35

57-58.
See supra, note 30, and corresponding text.
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by way of international deposit. Compatibility with the Paris Convention
exists in this situation also, by virtue of the fact that no more extensive
right or protection is made available to Restricted-Union nationals. The
national deposit is available to Restricted-Union and Union nationals alike.
It confers the same substantive right and the same protection as is conveyed by an international deposit which is open only to Restricted-Union
nationals. The fact that Restricted-Union nationals have two opportunities
for obtaining protection in the country of origin, whereas Union nationals
have but one, has not been deemed inconsistent with Article 2 of the Paris
Convention. At this time, there is no claim that this procedural difference
in fact amounts to a substantive discrimination inconsistent with the principle of national treatment.
The general conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis concerning the interrelationship between Articles 2 and 15 of the Paris Convention is that the power to conclude special agreements does not constitute a limitation on the principle of national treatment. 36 The Madrid and
Hague Arrangements demonstrate that the application of the principle of
national treatment does not so undermine special agreements that Article
15 becomes meaningless.
In its "two-convention" plan, the proposed patent convention resembles
both the Madrid and Hague Arrangements. As with these two Arrangements, the international convention of the EPC provides for a series of
national rights to come into existence by virtue of the single act of issuance
of a European patent pursuant to a single application. However, under the
Community convention of the plan, a unified right of protection will be
applicable to the Common Market territory, and will coexist with national
rights of the Common Market countries.
Limited availability of the European patent, relying on a "special arrangement" rationale, would probably constitute an impermissible discrimination as being contrary to the principle of national treatment. Unlike
the Madrid and Hague Arrangements, the EPC covers such important
substantive matters as standard of patentability, duration of protection, etc.
37
The EPC provisions often differ significantly from existing national laws.
Consequently, it would appear insufficient to satisfy the Article 2 obligation of the Paris Convention by continuing the availability of national
patents through national systems to nationals of Unionist states who are
not parties to the EPC.
36

For a further argument supporting this legal conclusion, see Ulmer, supra, note 26, p.
53, where he discusses the principle of national treatment and its possible limitation in relation
to the37Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
For an indication of such differences in national patent laws, see infra, note 47.
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In addition to the narrow interpretation of Article 2, advocates of limited
availability under the Draft Treaty have asserted, as a further ground for a

restrictive policy, the necessity of maintaining a strong bargaining position
with respect to acceding or associating states. Free availability would of
course admit all states on an equal basis. It would also undermine the
purpose of the association and accession provisions of the Draft Treaty.
States would experience less incentive to participate in a European patent
law by way of these provisions if they could enjoy its benefits without any

of the burdens which some form of signatory participation might involve.
Consequently, the EEC Member States could not impose on these states
such conditions to membership as was contemplated under the Draft

Treaty provisions.
Under the international convention of the "two-convention" plan, associate membership will probably not be provided for, thereby weakening the
originally contemplated bargaining position of the EEC countries vis-h-vis

other European states, and weakening also the objection to free availability
based on the notion of inseparability of burdens and benefits.3 8 The Patent
Cooperation Treaty has likely represented "competition" in the area of

patent cooperation and is probably responsible for the likely elimination of
associate membership. As regards accession, it has been noted above that
the Memorandum provided for an "open" Convention, a provision which
has been followed in the recently published first preliminary draft of the
international convention. Thus, the European patent should be available to
all states, subject to the sole limitation that legal and factual national
treatment be reciprocally accorded between states.

With reference to the operation of this limitation, an enlightening illustration may be provided by the American practice regarding conception and
reduction to practice. Pursuant to § 119 of the Patent Code,3 9 as it is
38

Froschmaier, supra, note 24. Compare the position on this issue of the (1970) Draft
Convention for a European System for the Grant of Patents, discussed in the text, supra, p.
143.
3935 U.S.C. § 119. Section 119 is the congressional implementation of Article 4 of the
Paris Convention, see supra, note 27. In pertinent part § 119 provides: "An application for
patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who has, or whose legal representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same
invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed
in the United States or to citizens of the United States, shall have the same effect as the same
application would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent
for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country, if the application in this country
is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such foreign application was
filed; but no patent shall be granted on any application for patent for an invention which had
been patented or described in a printed publication in any country more than one year before
the date of the actual filing of the application in this country, or which had been in public use
or on sale in this country more than one year prior to such filing."
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currently interpreted by the courts, 40 a foreign applicant's U.S. filing
date-not the foreign application date-is critical for purposes of prior-art
reference. Highly interesting, and sometimes emotional, arguments have
been made on both sides of the question whether this practice is discriminatory toward foreign applicants.4 1 The combination of this practice
and of the alleged practical unavailability of the U.S. interference proceeding to foreigners is responsible for strong criticism from European quarters. 42 Should this situation in American patent law be found to constitute
an effective discrimination against foreign applicants, the European patent
43
may well be found unavailable to U.S. nationals.
It is important to note that the insistence on "legal and factual recipro40Three recent decisions have considered the interpretation of § 119. The first was Eli
Lily & Co. v. Brenner, 248 F. Supp. 402, 174 USPQ 442 (D.D.C. 1965), which decided that
§ 119 was intended to provide a "status" for an application "for all purposes." Subsequently,
in Application of Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 149 USPQ 480 (CCPA 1966), the court reached a
contrary result, agreeing with the contention '"that the domestic filing date of a patent
obtained by a foreign applicant is the critical date to be considered when it is desired to use
the patent for anticipatory purposes,' that is, as an ordinary prior art reference" (149 USPQ at
489) and saying: "... . section 119 must be interpreted as giving only a positive right or benefit
to an applicant who has first filed abroad to protect him against possible intervening patent-defeating events in obtaining a patent." (149 USPQ at 496, with original emphasis). Basic
to the court's analysis was its distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" protection.
The court decided that through its relation to the priority provision of Article 4 of the Paris
Convention, §119 embodied offensive protection only, i.e., priority only as regards obtaining
patents. Reversing the earlier decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Eli Lily & Co. v. Brenner, 153 USPQ 95 (1967), followed the reasoning and result of the
Hilmer court, but noted (at 97): "We emphasize that we have been concerned only with a
foreign application filed in this country on a priority basis and invoked as a reference.
Different considerations may be involved in interference proceedings, but this we do not
decide."
41
For an analysis following the Eli Lilly "status" view, see Chasan & Rabin, Effective
Filing Dates of U.S. Patents Based on 35 U.S.C. Sec. 119, 45 JPOS 601 (1963); Fishman,
An Analysis of the Combined Effect of 35 USC §119 and 35 USC §102 (e), 46 JPOS 181
(1964). For discussion of the opposite point of view, see Currie, Re: An Analysis of the
Combined Effect of 35 USC Section 119 and 35 USC Section 102 (e), 46 JPOS 598 (1964);
Meyer, Are Patents Effective References as of Foreign Filing Dates?, 47 JPOS 391 (1965);
Note, United States Patents Claiming Foreign Filing Dates as References Against United
States Patent Applications, 21 Sw. L. J. 552 (1967); Sayko, Rule 131 Affidavits- Foreign
Priority Date not the Effective Date of a Patent as a Reference, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 137
(1966-67).
42
See Hartel, supra, note 25, 97.
4aThe prevailing attitude in European circles on this issue is described clearly by Dr.
Hirtel, president of the German Patent Office, in his remarks concerning the recently
published Draft Convention for a European System for the Grant of Patents, the international
convention of the two-convention arrangement envisaged by the Memorandum. Dr. Hartel
writes:
... Today, the principle of free availability is not disputed. However, according to the
Draft Convention, a limitation is attached to this principle. Nationals of non-contracting
states should be able to apply for European patents, provided that their states' laws grant
the same advantages with respect to the protection of inventions to the nationals of
contracting states as are granted to home nationals by their respective states, and in
particular provided that the laws of these third states do not condition the grant of a
patent on requirements which can be met only within the sovereign territory of the
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city" does not refer to "legislative reciprocity," but only to reciprocity as
respects the application of the principle of national treatment. The legislative history of the Paris Convention is clear on the point that any condi44
It
tioning of its terms on legislative reciprocity was absolutely rejected.
thus appears that possible justification for some form of limited availability,
at least with respect to the United States, has been shifted, with the
emergence of the "two-convention" plan, from a "special-arrangement"
line of reasoning to one of "legal and factual reciprocity" in the application
of national treatment.
Quasi-legal grounds have also been urged in support of limited availability. As a matter of practicality, the successful establishment and administration of a European Patent Office may require that for an initial period
the European patent should not be available to non-signatory states. Even
a few influential writers, who have argued strongly for free availability,
have acknowledged the possibility of this practical necessity. 45
respective third states. This limitation represents essentially only a repetition of the
national treatment principle in Article 2 of the Paris Convention. The inclusion of this
clause in the Draft Convention constitutes an essential and practical change. If it can be
said that until now each state itself has decided whether it was complying with the
national treatment principle of the Paris Convention, the Draft Convention envisages
that in the future the European Patent Office will determine whether a third state is
fulfilling the conditions of national treatment. The introduction of this stipulation in the
Draft Convention has been brought about by American patent law, namely the American
interference proceeding, which, as a practical matter, is not accessible to foreigners, and
is thus widely regarded in Europe as a serious disadvantage to them ...(Dr. Hirtel
mentions briefly recent evidence of U.S. Congressional reluctance to improve foreign
accessibility to the interference proceeding.) ...It will be necessary to wait to see
whether the limitation on availability in the Draft Convention will induce the responsible
American authorities to review their current position ... Ibid. (author's trans., emphasis
supplied)
In a resolution of the European Parliament on 5 February 1970, that body made unmistakably
clear its support for "absolute de jure and de facto reciprocity" regarding national treatment
of foreign patent applicants, 1970 GRUR INT. at 136. See also notes 23 and 24, supra, and
accompanying text. For a discussion dealing primarily with the impact of Article 11(3) of the
Patent Cooperation Treaty on § 119 of the U.S. Patent Code, but also discussing the
similarity of legal issues with respect to § 119 in either the PCT or EPC Context, see Singer,
Die internationale Patentanmeldung nach dem PCT-Plan als nationaler Stand der Technik,
1970 GRUR INT. 27.
44n his footnote 39, and by his own translation of a French semi-verbatim report of the
proceedings of the preliminary conference on the Paris Convention in 1880, Professor Maier
writes: "M. Herich, the delegate from Hungary, and M. Veniers van der Loeff, the delegate
from the Netherlands, requested the removal of the word 'reciprocally' which appeared to
them to give rise to a misconstruction by making it possible to suppose that the application of
article 2 rested not only on national treatment but also on the principle of reciprocity. Without
sharing these apprehensions, the Commission, considering that this word was not essential,
was able to satisfy this request by removing it." Maier, A New Look at the European Patent:
LimitedAvailability, 19 VAND. L. REV. 257, 268 (1966).
4Dr. Froschmaier has observed: "In spite of these deliberations (favoring free availability) the possibility may not entirely be excluded of restricting the accessibility to the
European patent for practical reasons for a certain period in order to avoid difficulties in
establishing the European Patent Office." Froschmaier, supra, note 6, p. 890. See also, Was,
Access to the European Patent, 7 PTC J. RES. & ED. 7 (1963).
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A final argument against free availability, often urged with some feeling,
is the contention that without some restrictive policy American business
enterprise will strengthen its position of dominance in the European market. 46 To some extent, the potential for strengthening of existing positions
may be present, for the exclusions from patentable subject-matter under
the 1962 Draft Treaty were significantly narrower than the then existing
exclusions under the national patent law of any EEC country, with the
exception of Belgium. 47 To the extent that national exclusions have not
been altered significantly in the interim period, this potential must be taken
into account even today, for the first preliminary draft on the international
convention has made little change in the 1962 Draft Treaty exclusions.
A concluding observation on the issue of availability may be made from
a somewhat different perspective. In addition to the Paris Convention, the
proposed EPC will have to take into consideration the existing bilateral
commercial treaties of its signatory states with other non-contracting countries. Indeed, Article 8 of the Draft Treaty has equal applicability to both
types of treaties. As between the signatory states, the conclusion of a
multilateral convention, having terms inconsistent with those of their respective FCN treaties with third states, might be regarded as an impermis48
sible modification of the inconsistent FCN provisions.
46

See e.g., Armengaud, Political Aspects of Accessibility to the European Patent, 7 PCT
J. RES. & ED. 314, 317 (1963); Meller, Towards a Multinational Patent System, 44 JPOS
227, 244 (1962); Weiser, Patent and Antitrust Developments and Prospects of the European
Economic Community, 8 PCT J. RES. & ED. 1, 8-9 (1964). Taking a contrary position are
Maier, supra, note 44, pp. 278-281, and Behrman, Licensing Abroad Under Patents, Trademarks, and Know-How by United States Companies, 2 PCT J. RES. & ED. 181, 185 (1958),
who argue that licensing is not a primary motive for U.S. companies to get European patent
protection,
but rather the patenting of their own products.
47
"Thus, for example, as opposed to Article 10 of the Draft (Treaty), the German
Federal Republic and Luxemburg declare to be non-patentable... inventionsfor food products, stimulants, pharmaceutical products and substances made by a chemical process in so
far as the inventions do not relate to a process of manufacture ... (T)he French patent law (,)
while excluding from protection pharmaceutical products, goes further in this connection than
Article 10 of the Draft (Treaty)... (T)he Italian patent law also excluded from patentability
pharmaceutical products of all kinds and the process of manufacture of such products. The
Dutch patent law prohibits in general the protection of chemical products and permits the
grant of patents protecting the process of manufacture only so far as these processes belong to
the industrial field." Ulmer, supra, note 26, 59. Further differences exist between the Draft
Treaty and national laws. With respect to the system of examination and grant of the patent,
the Draft Treaty provides for deferred examination, whereas Germany and Holland are
examining countries, while Belgium, France, Italy and Luxemburg are non-examining countries. Significant differences are also to be noted with respect to the duration of the patent
right.48
See 5 Hackworth, INTERNATIONAL LAW 234-46 (1943). Also, note that Art. 7 of the
1970 Draft Convention for a European System for the Grant of Patents is identical to Art 8 of
the 1962 Draft Treaty. For the text of Art. 7, see CCH Com. Mkt. Rep., para. 5511; for the
text of Art. 8, see text of this article, supra, p. II.
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IV. The EPC, Law-making Treaties and the Problem of
Conflict Between Treaties
"International legislation" is a potentially misleading concept. There is,
of course, no international legislature which serves the world community.
The term is nevertheless becoming more common. It is important to avoid,
in the international context, obscuring the principle of unanimity through
use of the word "legislation." By "legislation is (meant) really nothing more
than the conscious creation of law in contrast to the growth of law out of
custom." 49
Furthermore, "conventional international law shares with the internal
legislation of a state the characteristic 'that in both law is made in a direct,
conscious, and purposive manner, in contrast to law that originates in
custom." '' 50 But unlike national legislation, "the term 'international legislation' is a metaphor, since the essence of 'legislation' is that it binds all
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the body legislating, whether they
assent to it or not, whether their duly-appointed representatives assent to it
or not, whereas international legislation only binds parties who have duly
signed the law-making treaty and, where necessary, as it usually is, have
ratified it."' 51
Despite the common lawyer's traditional reliance on precedent, the
municipal field has experienced a more decisive acceptance of the role of
statutory and legislative action in the solution of modern problems. Full
recognition of the comparable role played by law-making treaties in the
transformation of the scope and content of international law has been
needed. The recent Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 5 2 represents probably the first essential element in the maturation of such recognition. While itself an imperfect product of a rather imperfect international
legislative process, the Vienna Convention provides the indispensiable
framework for promoting the growth and development of international
legislation by treaty. Ideally, increased awareness of, and respect for, the
role of law-making treaties will contribute measurably to the effective and
49
McNair, Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 1930 BRIT. Y. B. INTL.
L. 100,
115.
50
1d.
51
Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 1953 BRIT. Y. B. INTL. L. 401, 401. See
also, generally, McNair, International Legislation, 19 IOWA L. REV. 177 (1934), and I
Hudson International Legislation XII1 (1931 ).
5263 A.J.I.L. 875 (1969); 8 Int. Legal Materials 679 (1969). On the Vienna Convention
generally, see Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 A.J.I.L. 495 (1970); Sinclair,
Vienna Conference on the Law oj/Treaties, 19 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 47 (1970); Stanford, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 20 U. TORONTO L. J. 18 (1970).
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rational solution of urgent world problems, and to the stability of treaty
relations required by a world legal order.
With reference to the particular problem discussed in this article, the
formulation of a consistent body of coherent principles on the subject of
conflicts between law-making treaties has been a long-felt need. The EPC
and the Paris Convention present a situation raising the question of possible conflict between a regional instrument and an international instrument
designed to be of world-wide application.
Regional instruments serve a legitimate purpose when they supplement
general international instruments. They have the potential of giving the
international legislative structure needed flexibility. International instruments may be incapable of accomodating the many varied and complex
problems which arise in relation to their provisions. There is a greater
probability that these, often more specialized, problems can be resolved
with greater success and ease through regional action.
It may also be desirable to have a greater degree of cooperation in
certain areas, which might be realizable only under a regional agreement
due to the presence of a greater similarity of problems, as well as a greater
community of interests, at that level. This reality has been expressly
recognized by several multilateral treaties which provide for the creation of
special arrangements. Examples of such provisions are Article 52 of the
United Nations Charter, Article 9 of the Universal Postal Convention
(1952), Article 42 of the International Telecommunications Convention
(1952), and, of course, Article 15 of the Paris Convention. "The problem is
essentially one of balancing these advantages (of flexibility and accommodation of special interests) against the danger of conflict involved in the
coexistence of international and regional agreements on the same subject
and the possibility that regional agreements may tend to perpetuate, instead
of representing a stage in the elimination of, discrepancies and disparities
between different parts of the world in regard to matters in respect of
53
which a common international rule or standard is desirable."
In cases of conflict between successive treaty revisions, the Paris Convention employs the solution of construing the resulting inconsistent obligations as a series of bilateral arrangements, which apply to the relations
between different groups of parties. This solution is inapposite in the
EPC-Paris Convention context. The potential conflict presented by the
EPC and the Paris Convention is of a different quality and magnitude, for it
concerns immediately the principle of national treatment and not a relatively minor point of revision. It seems clear that if the EPC embraces the
53

Jenks, supra, note 5 1, 412.
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concept of limited availability obligations under the Paris Convention and
the EPC could be potentially wholly incompatible.
As we have seen, Article 15 of the Paris Convention authorizes the
conclusion of "special arrangements" which do not derogate from the
provisions of that Convention. That the EPC is a "special arrangement"
within the meaning of this article is conceded. The earlier argument that
"special arrangement" status constituted legal justification for limited availability was extremely controversial, and has now largely been abandoned.
Supplanting it as a possible legal basis for some form of limited availability
is the argument derived from the notion of legal and factual reciprocity in
according national treatment. It is this legal position and its relation to a
possible conflict between the EPC and the Paris Convention that require
further study.
It will be helpful to pursue this study in terms of the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Technically, however, these
provisions have no applicability as treaty law to the Paris Convention,
since, by virtue of the non-retroactivity provision in Article 4, the Vienna
Convention is precluded from applying to treaties concluded by states
before its entry into force. But this preclusion is without prejudice to the
application of any existing rules of customary international law, whether or
not contained in the Convention.5 4 Even so, as a practical matter, it seems
certain that the Vienna Convention's persuasive, rather than binding, force
will strongly induce voluntary reference to the substance of the Convention's provisions, for the purpose of resolving any treaty conflict concerning the availability of the European patent.
With respect to the general relation between the EPC and the Paris
Convention, one may legitimately pose the question whether the termination or suspension of the operation of the Paris Convention is to be implied
by the conclusion of the later EPC. Article 59 of the Vienna Convention
deals with this general problem. It indicates that termination or suspension
may occur only if, among other things, the parties to the later treaty include
at least all of the parties to the earlier one. 55 Thus, the conclusion of the
54

See Sinclair, supra, note 52, 49. On the related question of whether the Vienna
Convention is merely a codification of existing rule of customary international law, see id., at
49-50.
55
Article 59 provides in pertinent part:
1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty
relating to the same subject-matter and:
(a)...
(b)...
2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it appears from
the later treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intention of the parties.
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EPC would imply no termination of suspension of the operation of the

Paris Convention vis-At-vis a non-EPC Unionist state.
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention also governs the relation between

successive treaties relating to the same subject matter. It provides in
relevant part:
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be
considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of
that other treaty prevail.

Noting that Article 7 of the 1970 Draft Convention for a European System
for the Grant of Patents contains a clear expression of intended harmony
between the EPC and the Paris Convention, 56 Article 30, as a general
matter, compels the conclusion that in the case of any conflict between the
57
EPC and the Paris Convention, the provisions of the latter have priority.
Clearly, Articles 59 and 30 have a direct bearing on the general relation
between the EPC and the Paris Convention. But they are not dispositive of

the question of conflict between these two treaties on the specific issue of
availability of the European patent. Analysis of this question is complicated by the fact that the proponents of limited availability do not
unmistakedly challenge the priority of the Paris Convention provisions. On

the contrary, they assert that limited availability does not violate the
principle of national treatment contained in the Paris Convention.5 8
In order to evaluate the position in support of limited availability, it will
56
0n the relation of Art. 7 to Art. 8 of the 1962 Draft Treaty, see supra, note 48 and
accompanying text.
57
1n subsequent paragraphs, which set forth rules for various conflict situations, Article
30 details additional circumstances in which the general conclusion of Paris-Convention
priority has validity (para. 4(b)), and also those which logically support a contrary result
(paras. 3 and 4(a)):

3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the
earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under Article 59, the earlier
treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later
treaty.
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the parties to the
earlier one:
(a) as between states parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a state party to both treaties and a state party to only one of the
treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties governs their mutual rights and
obligations.
It should be noted that the rules of paragraph 4 determine only the "mutual rights and
obligations" of the particular parties in the circumstances therein described. Article 30 does
not specify the legal consequences of assigning treaty priorities. However, should the conclusion of the EPC constitute an infringement of the rights of a party to the Paris Convention,
it would be reasonable to assume that all of the normal consequences of breach of a treaty
would follow with respect to the Paris Convention. See, e.g., the commentary to the international
Law Commission Draft Article 26, in 61 A.J.I.L. at 346-47.
58
Compare note 56 and accompanying text, supra, with the language of Art. '5 of the
1970 Draft Convention for a European System for the Grant of Patents in note 23, supra.
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be helpful to refer to Articles 60 and 45 of the Vienna Convention, and to
60
59
the international law rules of lex prior and pacta sunt servanda.

59

The lex-prior rule is based on the notion that an earlier law is not superseded by a later
law. It is derived by analogy from the law of contract and is of particular importance in
respect of conflicts between bilateral treaties. On the application of this principle, Jenks has
written: "It is significant that, while the lex prior principle is an important one in the law of
contract, there is no corresponding principle in the law of statutory interpretation, where, on
the contrary, the lex posterior principle (subsequent law supersedes earlier law) represents the
general rule. This suggests considerable caution in applying the principle to law-making
treaties." Jenks, supra, note 51, p. 443. On principles of treaty conflict generally, see Jenks,
supra, note 5 I, and Aufricht, Supersession of Treaties in International Law, 37 CORNELL
L.Q. 655 (1952).
6
The rule interdicts the conclusion of a treaty between states A and B without the
consent of state C, if the A-B treaty would be contrary to the obligations of A and/or B
toward C under an earlier treaty. In certain cases, inter se agreements have been declared
invalid because they were contrary to the international law rule of pacta sunt servanda. While
the existing case law regarding conflicting law-making treaties is fragmentary and unfortunately lacking of a consistent body of principles, the Oscar Chinn (PCIJ, Ser. A/B No. 63 (1934))
and Austro-German Customs R~gime (PCIJ, Ser. A/B No. 41 (1931)); cases may be of
possible relevance to the EPC and Paris Convention situation.
In the Oscar Chinn case, Judges Van Eysinga and Schucking, in dissenting opinions,
considered that the signature and ratification of the Convention of St. Germain(1919), relating
to the Congo Basin, by some of the signatories to the General Act of Berlin (1885) constituted
an invalid modification of the earlier instrument by failing to have the assent of all of the
signatories thereto. While the General Act of Berlin contained no provision permitting the
separate conclusion of private agreements among contracting states, Article 15 of the Paris
Convention provides for such special arrangements but only on the condition that they do not
derogate from the provisions of the Convention.
Perhaps more relevant to the EPC situation is the Austro-German Customs Regime case,
which illustrates the problem of a later treaty conflicting with an earlier one because it is
incompatible with the specific terms, or because it is incompatible with the "purposes," of the
earlier treaty. In this case, the Permanent Court of International Justice was called upon to
give an advisory opinion regarding the compatibility between a proposed customs union
between Germany and Austria, and prior multilateral treaty obligations of Austria, in particular those represented by Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and a Geneva Protocol
No. 1.
Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain provided:
The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the
Council of the League of Nations. Consequently, Austria undertakes in the absence of
the said Council to abstain from any act which would directly or indirectly or by any
means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to
membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another power.
Austria also undertook, in Geneva Protocol No. I and in accordance with Article 88, to
abstain from negotiation which would compromise her independence and
(to) not violate her economic independence by granting to any state a special regime or
exclusive advantages calculated to threaten her independence.
By a vote of 8 to 7, the Court held that the proposed customs union would not be
compatible with the Geneva Protocol No. 1, on the ground that it constituted a "special
regime" discriminating in favor of Germany to the exclusion of third states. Six of the eight
judges in the majority also found a violation of Article 88.
These cases are suggestive only of the possible attitudes and approaches which might be
taken in determining the legal relationship of the EPC to the Paris Convention. For a brief
review of other cases on treaty conflicts, see Jenks, supra, note 51, 420-24; and Aufricht,
supra, note 59.
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Article 60 of the Vienna Convention recognizes the right of a state to
invoke the termination or suspension of the operation of a multilateral
treaty in response to a material breach of that treaty by another state party
to it. It is particularly relevant to the issue of limited availability of the
European patent. 6 1 Article 60 provides in pertinent part:
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by .one of the parties entitles:
(a)...
(b) a party specially affected by the oreach to invoke it as a ground for
suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the
relations between itself and the defaulting state;
(c) any party other than the defaulting state to invoke the breach as a
ground for suspending the operation itself if the treaty is of such a
character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically
changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations under the treaty.
In the light of Article 60, it appears that the issue of limited availability
can be viewed appropriately in terms of the termination or suspension by
EPC states of the operation of the Paris Convention's national-treatment
provision, as a consequence of a breach of that provision by a third-party
state. 62 This statement of the issue reveals the legal underpinnings of the
position in support of limited availability. Also, it accurately reflects the
reasoning underlying the principle of reciprocity in according national
63
treatment, which was discussed earlier.
Limited availability, therefore, will be possible only in those situations in
which the application of the principle of reciprocity is legally justifiable.
But this observation does not aid in answering what is perhaps the most
difficult question of whether national treatment is accorded, both in law and
in fact, in a particular instance.6 4 Nor does it indicate when a demonstrated
lack of national treatment may not be relied upon for application of the
principle of reciprocity, i.e., for justification of limited availability. Such
justification must be determined by reference to the rules of lex prior and
pacta sunt servanda, both of which have their essential basis in good faith.
The rule of lex prior should not be mechanically applied to establish the
priority of the Paris Convention over the EPC. Stressing the importance of
flexibility in applying this rule, Jenks has observed:
61

Consider supra, note 58 and accompanying text.
Even though an attempt to introduce the concept of proportionality-measurco response to breach-into Article 60 failed, it should not be assumed that the operative condition
of "material breach" will require, as a practical matter, that the response be termination or
suspension of the operation of the entire treaty. Compare the separability provision in Article
44, and see Stanford, supra, note 52, pp. 37-38.
6See supra, notes 39-43, and accompanying text.
"The 1970 Draft Convention for a European System for the Grant of Patents provides
that the European Patent Office will have jurisdiction over this question. See also supra, note
43.
62
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it is necessary to have regard to the fact that in view 'of the requirement of
unanimity in the international sphere the role of postulating the invalidity of the
second inconsistent treaty must be subject to suitable modifications so as to
prevent a beneficient legal principle from becoming a source of absurdity and
of obstruction of the peaceful processes of international change.' As our
horizon of the peaceful processes of international change extends to include
technological and social as well as political development, the importance of this
consideration continues to grow.6 5 (original footnote omitted)
Jenks recognizes that embodied in the rule of lex prior is the belief that, as
a matter of good faith, prior obligations should be met. However, he also
takes the position that the lex-prior rule is not a necessary consequence of
good faith.
On the other hand, the principle of good faith provides a close connection between the rule of lex prior and the rule of pacta sunt servanda.
Furthermore, that pacta sunt servanda is firmly entrenched as a respected
rule of international law is reflected in the statement that "(t)he defeat of an
attempt to weaken the rule of pacta sunt servanda was the most significant
action taken by the (Vienna Conference with respect to Part III of the
Treaty)." '66 Indeed, the Preamble to the Vienna Convention notes that "the
principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda
rule are universally recognized."
The case of the United States presents an excellent example for illustrating the relevance and application of these rules in the determination of
possible justification for limited availability of the European patent. Reference has been made previously to the arguably discriminatory effect on
foreign nationals resulting from the application of Section 119 of the
United States Patent Code, as currently interpreted. Whether this alleged
discrimination, which presumably has existed and has been the subject of
protest for a number of years, can now be asserted as a basis for avoiding
existing obligations under the Paris Convention, presents essentially a
question of good faith. As we have seen, the principle of good faith is the
67
foundation of the lex-prior and pacta-sunt-servanda rules.
Pertinent to this question is Article 45 of the Vienna Convention, which
provides:
A state may no longer invoke a ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty under Articles 46 to 50 or
Articles 60 and 62 if, after becoming aware of the facts:
(a) it shall have expressly agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force
or continues in operation, as the case may be; or
(b) it must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in
6Jenks, supra, note 51, 445. See also Lauterpacht, Contracts to Break a Contract, 52
529 (1936).
Kearney & Dalton, supra, note 52, 516.
67
Consider Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, which provides:

LAW QUARTERLY REV.
66
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the validity of the treaty or in its maintenance in force or in operation,
as they case may be.

The International Law Commission's commentary to its draft of this article-the Vienna Conference adopted the ILC draft article virtually unchanged- explains further:
(1) The foundation of the principle that a party is not permitted to benefit from
its own inconsistencies is essentially good faith and fair dealing...
Sub-paragraph (b) provides that a right to invoke a ground of invalidity,
termination, etc. shall also be no longer exercisable if after becoming aware of
the fact a state's conduct has been such that it must be considered as having
acquiesced, as the case may be, in the validity of the treaty or its maintenance
in force or in operation. In such a case the state is not permitted to take up a
legal position which is in contradiction with the position which its own previous conduct must have led the other parties to suppose that it had taken up
with respect to the validity, maintenance in force or maintenance in operation
of the treaty ...(But considering) that the application of the rule in any given
case would necessarily turn upon the facts and that the governing consideration
would be that of good faith ... the principle would not operate if the state in
question had not been aware of the facts giving rise to the right or had not been
in a position freely to exercise its right to invoke the nullity of the treaty ...68

In essence, then, the problem is thus reduced to the factual determination of whether those states parties to the EPC have "not been in a

position freely to exercise (their) right to invoke the nullity of the (Paris
Convention or at least its national treatment provision)," or have volun-

tarily acquiesced in the practice under Section 119, assuming such practice
9
to have been established as contrary to Article 2 of the Paris Convention.6
If the latter, there appears to be no legal basis, in the particular situation
relating to Section 119, either for the application of the principle of recipro-

city or for the limitation of availability of the European patent againsi
United States nationals.

As a general proposition, other contexts in which the question of limited
availability of the European patent arises will likewise require the determination of the presence or absence of national treatment, both legally and
factually, and of the existence of good faith. The foundation of the pro-

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith.
The International Law Commission's commentary to its draft to this article states: "Pacta
sunt servanda-the rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good
faith-is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties." Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties,
61 A.J.I.L. 263, 334 (1967).
68
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties,61 A.J.1.L. 263, 392-93 (1967).
6"Compare a U.S.-supported amendment to Article 45, in the form of a statute of
limitations, that would have barred a state from challenging the validity of a treaty, if 10 years
had elapsed since its entry into force. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 42- 21-26. See
Kearney & Dalton, supra, note 52, p. 526.
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posed analysis of this question is drawn in the first instance from the legal
rules of lex prior and pacta sunt servanda.
V. Conclusion
There can be little doubt that there is a definite need for cooperation in
the field of patents. The Patent Cooperation Treaty, proposed by BIRPI in
1968, evidences recognition of this need at the international level. The
proposed European Patent Convention is essentially a regional arrangement which, while recognizing this same need, demonstrates a broader
purpose.
The EPC is a more comprehensive and complex instrument for promoting cooperation in the patent field than is the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
Its close relationship to the EEC supports this characterization. The view
has been expressed that the attainment of the economic and political
objectives of the EEC requires the continual and expanding integration of
the Member States of the Community. According to this view, the proposed European patent is conceived as playing an integral role and fulfilling
a special need as regards the eventual success of the Common Market,
even though its jurisdiction will extend to more European countries than
merely the Six.
The availability of the European patent is an issue of great importance
and interest on both sides of the Atlantic. Apart from any legal considerations, limited availability, at least for an initial period, has been claimed
to be a practical necessity for the establishment of the European Patent
Office, which means the successful functioning of the new system as a
whole. While financial and administrative problems may place substantial
burdens on the states participating in the EPC, they do not appear, by
themselves, legally sufficient to justify denial of the national treatment to
nationals of Paris-Union states which are not parties to the European
Patent Convention.
The limiting of availability of the European patent on the principle of
reciprocal national treatment is a newly assented position. It appears,
however, to have sound support in Article 2 of the Paris Convention.
Nevertheless, in individual cases the judicial determination of reciprocal
national treatment presents a foreseeably-difficult problem. Moreover, legal
principles of treaty conflict may preclude, under certain circumstances, the
assertion of an actual violation of the principle of national treatment under
the Paris Convention as justification for denying availability of the European patent under the EPC.
Keeping in mind the difficult nature of establishing the absence of reciprocity, and in the interest of the development of the international legislative
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process, it would be preferable that any real or alleged conflict between the
EPC and the Paris Convention be resolved by negotiation between the
interested parties rather than by resort to an authoritative judicial determination. For, as Brierly has written:

(l)t is a mistake to think that by some ingenious manipulation of existing legal
doctrines we can always find a solution for the problems of a changing international world. That is not so; for many of these problems ... the only
remedy is that states should be willing to take measures to bring the legal
situation into accord with new needs, and if states are not reasonable enough to
do that, we must not expect the existing law to relieve them of the consequences. Law is bound to uphold the principle that treaties are to be observed; it cannot be made an instrument for revising them, and if political
motives sometimes lead to a treaty being treated as 'a scrap of paper' we must
not invent a pseudo-legal principle to justify such action. The remedy has to be
sought elsewhere, in political, not in juridical action. Law of Nations 247- 248
(4th ed. 1949).70

There exists the possibility that recognition of the special nature and

purpose of the European patent will motivate Unionist states which are not
parties to the EPC to refrain from an inflexible assertion of rights accorded
by the Paris Convention. Especially in the case of the United States might
the success of the EPC, realizing its important relationship to the EEC, be
regarded as a matter of national interest, to induce the minimization of any
adverse effects resulting from a treaty conflict rather than opposing such
conflict head-on. While acknowledging the major contribution of legal principles in resolving treaty conflicts, Jenks had also stated:
that the problem of conflicts of treaties is neither new nor negligible, that it may
involve major political issues as well as legal technicalities, and that it is closely
related to the fundamental problem of international law, namely, that of reconciling the claims of legal order, stability and respect for duly-created rights and
of growth, development and change which conobligations with the pressure
7
stitutes the law of life itself. '
The development of international law, and of the international legislative
process, would be greatly enhanced if the resolution of the controversy
concerning availability of the European patent under the European Patent
Convention, and indeed of many international law problems generally,
could be reached in the spirit suggested by Brierly and Jenks. The essence
of this spirit is cooperation. It is something deserving of the strongest
encouragement in the relations between the member states of the world

community.

70
Bishop, INT'L. L. 207 (1962).
71Jenks, supra, note 5 I, p. 408. See also, generally, McNair, supra, note 5 I, p. 189.
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